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LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION REVIEWS 
2007 EC Competition Law and Sector-specific Regulatory




To the best of the author’s knowledge, YARS is the first English language 
publication, which aims to systematically present the developments in competition 
law and sector-specific regulatory case law with direct relevance to Poland. This 
paper, devoted to EC antitrust and regulatory case law, will be divided into 
separate sections covering competition law sensu stricto (antitrust and merger 
control), State aid and sector-specific regulation. The reviews presented reflect 
the development of each case, so both administrative decisions and judgments 
(where available) are addressed under the same heading. 
This contribution aims to present an overview of significant cases decided by, 
or pending before, European Community institutions since Poland’s accession 
to the European Union (EU). This approach imposes constraints on the level 
of detail in the case summaries presented. It is the author’s intention to focus 
on a narrower selection of decisions and developments allowing Polish readers 
to place the decisions related to Poland in a broader context. 
Summary
Poland joined the EU on 1 May 2004. The initial “honeymoon” period has, 
generally speaking, been a happy one and there have been few prominent cases 
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decided at the administrative level (i.e. the European Commission) or brought 
before the judiciary (i.e. the European Community Courts). That said, usually 
following notifications by Polish authorities, the Commission has taken a number 
of important individual decisions in the field of State aid (including the misuse of 
aid decisions in the steel sector and the Power Purchase Agreements decision), 
which have led to litigation before the Community Courts. The Commission’s 
decisions in Polish cases have already provided important clarifications (e.g. 
regarding the application of alternative State aid exemptions to pre-accession 
restructuring cases in Technologie Buczek) and raised significant new legal 
issues (e.g. the application of the EC State aid rules to pre-accession aid under 
Protocol No. 8 of the Accession Treaty in Huta Częstochowa or an agent’s actions 
triggering pre-accession cartel liability in BR/ESBR). Pending actions in these 
cases can and lead to further case law developments, especially with regard to 
Protocol No. 8 the Commission’s Rescue & Restructuring Guidelines.
Case summaries
I. Antitrust
Butadiene Rubber (BR) and Emulsion Styrene Butadiene Rubber (ESBR)
On 29 November 2006, the Commission adopted a decision1 finding that 
five groups of companies, including the Polish company Trade-Stomil Sp. z o.o. 
(“Trade-Stomil”), have infringed Article 81 EC and Article 53 of the EEA 
Agreement by agreeing on price targets for products; sharing customers by 
means of non-aggression agreements; and exchanging commercial information 
relating to prices, competitors and customers for certain types of synthetic 
rubber, including butadiene rubber (BR) and emulsion styrene butadiene 
rubber (ESBR).2 Another Polish company, Dwory S.A. (renamed Synthos 
S.A.) was also targeted by the Commission’s investigation but in the end, its 
liability could not be established because there was insufficient evidence of 
its participation in this cartel3. 
1  Commission Decision C (2006) 5700 final of 29 November 2006 in Case COMP/F/ 38.638 
– Butadiene Rubber and Emulsion Styrene Butadiene Rubber. A non-confidential version of the 
Decision is available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/38638/
en.pdf. 
2 The main customers for BR and ESBR are tyre manufacturers such as Michelin, Pirelli 
and Goodyear, as well as producers of shoe soles and floor coverings. 
3  See paragraph 88 of the Decision.Vol. 2008, 1(1)
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The Commission’s investigation was prompted by leniency applications 
lodged in December 2002 and January 2003, in accordance with the 2002 
Leniency Notice, by the German company Bayer AG. In March 2003, the 
Commission carried out a dawn raid at Dow Deutschland GmbH & Co. OHG, 
which subsequently also applied for leniency. 
The Commission based its decision principally on documents provided 
by the leniency applicants, which included corporate statements and witness 
testimonies as well as notes discovered by the Commission during the dawn 
raid. The Commission found that the majority of the cartel agreements were 
made either before or after a meeting of the European Synthetic Rubber 
Association. During these meetings, the participants agreed on prices and 
exchanged information on key customers and the amounts of synthetic rubber 
supplied to them. Bayer’s statements were to a large extent confirmed by Dow. 
At a later stage, Shell also admitted to having participated in this cartel.
The Commission fined the five groups of companies a total of EUR 519 
million. Bayer received full immunity from fines under the Commission’s 
leniency programme, as it was the first company to inform the Commission 
about the cartel. Shell’s admission was received too late in the investigation 
to qualify for a reduction in fines since its contribution to the findings of the 
case was not significant. Trade-Stomil was fined EUR 3.8 million out of the 
total fine imposed on the entire cartel. 
In setting the fines, the Commission took into account the size of the EEA 
market for the product, the duration of the cartel (it operated from 1996 until 
2002) and the size of the firms involved. The fines for Eni, Shell and Bayer 
were increased by 50% because of their previous participation in other cartels 
(polypropylene, PVC and citric acid). 
Similarly to all other addressees of this decision (except Bayer)4, Trade-Stomil 
has lodged an appeal seeking its annulment5. It has argued, inter alia, that the 
Commission has failed to prove to the required standard that Trade-Stomil 
either participated in the cartel or that it was liable for the infringement (in 
the BR/ESBR decision, the Commission deemed Trade-Stomil liable for the 
infringement as Dwory’s independent distributor). It has also made a number 
of arguments challenging the level of its fine6. 
It is noteworthy that while the appeals are pending, on 21 December 2007, 
Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. (the second-largest U.S. tyre maker) and 25 other 
4 Cases T-38/07, Shell Petroleum and Others v Commission; T-42/07, Dow Chemical and 
Others v Commission; T-44/07, Kaučuk v Commission; T-45/07, Unipetrol v Commission; and 
T-59/07, Polimeri Europa v. Commission.
5  Case T-53/07, pending.
6  For more detail, see OJ [2007] C 95/45.YEARBOOK of ANTITRUST and REGULATORY STUDIES
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companies have brought before the High Court of England & Wales follow-on 
damage actions against the members of the cartel, including Trade-Stomil.
II. Mergers
None of the merger cases with a nexus to Poland reviewed by the Commission 
so far have involved an in-depth market review7 or have led to significant case 
law developments. One case of note, however, is the Unicredito/HVB decision 
that led to a political controversy regarding the Commission’s competence in 
the merger area. A few other noteworthy cases involved close cooperation 
between the Commission and the Polish Competition and Consumer Protection 
Authority (UOKiK) under the referral provisions of the EC Merger Regulation 
(ECMR).
Unicredito/HVB (2005)
On 13 September 2005, an Italian financial institution, Unicredito Ital-
iano SpA (Unicredito), notified the Commission that it has acquired control 
over another bank, Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank AG (HVB)8. Both 
Unicredito and HVB had, at that time, holdings in the Polish banking sec-
tor (  Pekao S.A. and Bank Przemysłowo-Handlowy S.A., respectively). The 
Commission examined, amongst other things, the effects of the concentra-
tion on the Polish financial markets and, on 18 October 2005, unconditionally 
approved it.
Poland appealed9 to the Court of First Instance (CFI) claiming that 
the Commission has failed to properly examine the concentration since it 
had not taken into account the existence and effects of Article 3(9) of the 
Pekao privatization agreement. Poland also argued that the Commission had 
“inappropriately evaluated concentrations on the Polish banking market and 
erred in its appraisal of the effect of the proposed concentration would have 
on competition within the market for investment funds and a number of 
specific markets within the Polish banking sector”10. 
 7 E.g. on 18 October 2005, the Commission opened an in-depth (Phase II) investigation 
into the proposed acquisition of Eurotecnica by Agrolinz Melamine International. The case was 
referred to the Commission by the German Bundeskartellamt and the Polish UOKiK. However, 
the notifying parties withdrew from the transaction and the related Commission’s documents 
are not publicly available.
 8 Case  COMP/M.3894.
 9 Action brought on 6 February 2006 in Case T-41/06 – Poland v. Commission 
(withdrawn).
10  Application in Case T-41/06, first head.Vol. 2008, 1(1)
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This appeal was withdrawn on 10 April 2008, following a change in the 
Polish government.
PKN Orlen’s Acquisitions – Unipetrol (2005) and Mazeikiu (2006)
In 2005 and 2006, PKN Orlen acquired two petrochemical companies in 
the Czech Republic (Unipetrol a.s.) and Lithuania (AB Mazeikiu Nafta). 
Both transactions exceeded the ECMR thresholds and had to be approved 
by the Commission under the new test of “significant impediment of effective 
competition”.
The Unipetrol acquisition was finally notified on 11 March 2005, and 
unconditionally approved on 20 April 200511. In line with its previous 
decisions, the Commission examined, in particular, the market for non-retail 
sales of refined oil products and bitumen (national scope) and the market 
for lubricating petroleum oils (EEA scope). After the examination, the 
Commission decided not to oppose the notified concentration.
The Mazeikiu acquisition was notified on 29 September 2006, and 
unconditionally approved on 7 November 200612. This concentration had an 
effect on a number of markets. Horizontally, the operation affected the market 
for ex-refinery/cargo sales of diesel, gasoline and LPG (EEA-wide) and the 
national markets for non-retail sales of diesel and gasoline in Poland. It also 
vertically affected the national markets for the sale of diesel and gasoline in 
Poland, Lithuania, the Czech Republic and Estonia, as well as the market for 
retail sales of motor fuels in Poland. The Commission examined in particular 
a distinction between ex-refinery cargo sales and non-retail sales, as well as 
the geographic scope of the ex-refinery/cargo sales market (EEA or narrower, 
e.g. CEE). Typically for a Phase I case, the Commission did not need to reach 
a final conclusion on these points.
Linde/BOC (2006)
On 6 April 2006, Linde AG notified its acquisition of BOC Group plc.13 
The concentration was approved on 6 June 2006 after a Phase I investigation, 
subject to extensive commitments. Of particular note is that the activities 
of Linde and BOC overlapped on a number of markets for industrial and 
specialty gases in Poland and the UK. The transaction would have created a 
dominant player in various Polish gas markets and would have strengthened 
BOC’s dominant position on various British markets. On 27 April 2006, the 
11 Case  COMP/M.3543.
12 Case  COMP/M.4348.
13 Case  COMP/M.4141.YEARBOOK of ANTITRUST and REGULATORY STUDIES
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Polish UOKiK submitted a request for a partial referral of this case14 since 
it believed that the concentration would affect competition on a number of 
national markets in Poland, in particular, the bulk and cylinder supply of 
various industrial gases, helium retail supply as well as the supply of calibration 
mixtures and refrigerants. The request was withdrawn on 18 May 2006 after 
the parties had submitted remedies that addressed all UOKiK’s concerns15.
Carrefour/Ahold (2007)
On 16 February 2007, the Commission received notification of a proposed 
acquisition of control by Carrefour Nederland B.V. (part of the French Carrefour 
group) of Ahold Polska Sp. z o.o.16 Carrefour is internationally active in food 
and non-food retailing, Ahold Polska is active in the same field but solely in 
Poland. The main horizontal overlap between Carrefour and Ahold arose in 
the retail market for daily consumer goods retail through modern distribution 
channels (supermarkets, hypermarkets and discounters) in Poland.
UOKiK made a request under Article 9(2)(b) of the ECMR asking the 
Commission to cede jurisdiction to investigate the proposed merger. The 
Commission accepted that the transaction’s effects on competition would 
affect a number of markets within Poland, which present all the characteristics 
of distinct markets, and which do not constitute a substantial part of the 
Single Market. Thus, on 10 April 2007, the Commission referred the case 
to the Polish UOKiK under Article 9(3) of the ECMR (which removes the 
Commission’s discretion to act). 
The transaction was conditionally approved by UOKiK on 28 June 2007, 
subject to divestiture by Carrefour of nine clearly identified supermarkets by 
31 December 200817.
III. State aid
This section covers the Commission’s decisions that followed a formal 
investigation procedure under Article 88(2) EC taken in the period up to 
the end of 2007. The cases involve the steel sector (Huta Częstochowa, Huta 
Stalowa Wola, Technologie Buczek and Huta Arcelor Warszawa), as well as 
14  Pursuant to Art. 9(2)(a) ECMR. 
15 The parties committed to divest, among other things, the whole of BOC’s Polish gas 
business and the whole of Linde’s UK gas business (thereby completely removing their overlaps 
in all relevant Polish and UK markets). 
16  Case COMP/M.4522 – Carrefour/Ahold Polska.
17  Decision DOK – 86/2007.Vol. 2008, 1(1)
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other sectors (Techmatrans, Bison-Bial, FSO, Poczta Polska and PPAs). With 
minor exceptions relating to the mixed nature of the decisions, this section 
does not cover schemes18, pending cases19, cases withdrawn20 or instances, 
where the Commission found no aid21.
A. Rescue and restructuring aid
Article 87(1) EC sets out a general prohibition of State aid, subject to a 
limited number of exceptions. The normal operation of the market demands 
that inefficient firms go out of business. While rescue and restructuring aid may 
keep firms in difficulty viable, this is often at the expense of their competitors. 
Therefore, rescue or restructuring aid granted to failing firms is only permitted 
in limited and strictly defined circumstances. 
Steel sector cases
Restructuring aid is generally prohibited in the steel sector22. However, new 
Member States are usually given a one-off opportunity to restructure their steel 
industry with the help of State aid. Protocol No. 8 of the Accession Treaty23 
granted this type of derogation to Poland so that it could support, in the 
context of accession, companies identified in the National Steel Restructuring 
program (“NRP”)24. A maximum amount of aid to be granted before the end 
of 2003 was set at approximately PLN 3.4 billion (EUR 850 million). The 
granting of aid was conditional on: the adoption and full implementation of 
a restructuring plan, attaining economic viability of the benefiting companies 
by 2006, and a significant reduction of production capacity in excess of one 
million tons. Two of the Protocol No. 8 cases (involving Technologie Buczek 
and Huta Arcelor Warszawa) led to a formal investigation. In the case involving 
18  E.g. Case C-34/2007 – Maritime transport.
19  E.g. the Polish shipyard cases (C-17/2005 – Stocznia Gdynia, C-18/2005 – Stocznia Gdańsk 
and C-19/2005 – Stocznia Szczecińska Nowa).
20  E.g. Case C-49/2005 – Chemobudowa Kraków.
21  E.g. Case C-32/2006 – Huta Cynku Miasteczko Ślaskie.
22  Communication from the Commission on Rescue and Restructuring aid and closure for 
the steel sector, OJ [2002] C70/21.
23 Protocol No. 8 of the Accession Treaty on the restructuring of the Polish steel industry, 
OJ [2003] L236/948. A similar Protocol No. 2 applies to the Czech Republic, OJ [2003] 
L236/942.
24 Protocol No. 8 identified eight steel producers. Three of them eventually went into 
liquidation (Technologie Buczek, Huta Andrzej and Huta Batory), while five companies restored 
their economic viability (Mittal Steel Poland, Huta Arcelor Warszawa, Huta Bankowa, Huta 
Łabędy and Huta Pokój). YEARBOOK of ANTITRUST and REGULATORY STUDIES
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Mittal Steel Poland (ex Polskie Huty Stali S.A.), the largest steel producer in 
Poland, the Commission accepted modifications of the ongoing restructuring 
process without opening a formal investigation25. Additionally, two formal 
investigations were opened involving steel producers that were outside of 
Protocol No. 8 (Huta Częstochowa and Huta Stalowa Wola).
Huta Częstochowa
Huta Częstochowa S.A. (HCz) is Poland’s second-largest steel producer. 
Due to financial difficulties, it went into liquidation at the end of 2002 and 
consequently was removed from the list of beneficiaries covered by the NRP. As 
a result, it was later not included in Protocol No. 8 to the Accession Treaty. 
In October 2003, the Polish government adopted a law allowing public 
debt to be written off in relation to failing companies for the purposes of 
restructuring. Public law creditors (e.g. social security or tax offices) and 
creditors from commercial transactions (e.g. energy delivery) were split into 
two different groups that, in exchange for a waiver of their claims, received 
different assets (sold to pay parts of the claims). HCz subsequently planned 
comprehensive restructuring that included taking advantage of the debt waiver 
(even though the company was not eligible for State aid under Protocol 
No. 8). 
On 19 May 2005, the Commission opened a formal investigation26 into the 
restructuring process of HCz’s27. In particular, the Commission considered 
that a waiver of public debt implied foregoing State revenue in a situation, 
where no private creditor would have done the same. According to settled 
case law, where a debtor in financial difficulties is proposing to reschedule 
debt to avoid liquidation, each public creditor must, at the very least, carefully 
balance the advantage inherent in obtaining the offered sum according to 
the restructuring plan and the sum that could be recovered due to possible 
liquidation. If liquidation brings higher proceeds than restructuring, the waiver 
of public claims qualifies as State aid28. 
Considering the data provided by the Polish authorities (including a 
comprehensive analysis of all claims concerned, which was prepared by external 
experts), on 5 July 2005, the Commission adopted a mixed decision29. On the 
25  Case N 186/2005, OJ [2006] C 12/2.
26  OJ [2004] C 204/6.
27 Case C-20/2004 (ex NN/25/2004) – Restructuring aid to steel producer Huta 
Częstochowa.
28 C-342/96, Tubacex [199] ECR I-2459, para. 46; C-256/97, DMT [1999] ECR I-3913, 
para. 21 and T-152/99, HAMSA [2002] ECR II-3049, para. 167.
29  OJ [2006] L 366/1.Vol. 2008, 1(1)
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one hand, it found that the restructuring scheme did not involve State aid. In 
particular, the decision established that aid evaluation may take into account 
a realistic bankruptcy scenario (in which bankruptcy proceedings are more 
time-consuming and costly than restructuring). On this basis, and following a 
detailed assessment of all claims and waivers, the Commission concluded that the 
write-off of public claims complied with normal market behaviour, as it offered 
every public creditor a solution that was more advantageous than bankruptcy. 
On the other hand, the Commission also decided that around EUR 4 
million of restructuring aid given to the company between 1997 and 2002 
constituted aid incompatible with EC State aid rules and thus, had to be 
returned. While the recovery concerned a period of time before accession 
(where the Commission normally has no jurisdiction), it was ordered under 
Protocol No. 8, which covers the time frame starting before and continuing 
after accession and clearly differs from other State aid provisions of the Treaty, 
such as the interim mechanism30. The Commission considered that Protocol 
No. 8 could be regarded as lex specialis that, with regard to its subject matter, 
would supersede any other provision of the Accession Act. 
The decision cleared the way for the sale of the company to the Ukrainian 
steel producer, Donbass. However, Donbass31, HCz32 and other third parties33 
appealed the decision. On 11 December 2006, the CFI dismissed HCz’s 
application for interim measures34. These cases are pending before the CFI 
on grounds of merit. 
Huta Stalowa Wola
On 8 October 2004, Poland informed the Commission about measures 
granted to support the restructuring of Huta Stalowa Wola S.A. (HSW), a Polish 
industrial machinery company35. According to the Polish authorities, as the aid 
was granted before accession, it could not be considered still applicable after. 
On 23 November 2005, the Commission opened a formal investigation into the 
restructuring aid given to HSW36. The examination focused on the write-off of 
30 See Kuik K., “State Aid and the 2004 Accession – Overview of Recent Developments” 
(2004) 3(3) European State Aid Law Quarterly.
31 Case T-273/06, ISD Polska and Industrial Union of Donbass v. Commission, application 
filed on 11 September 2006.
32 Case  T-288/06,  Huta Częstochowa v. Commission, application filed on 18 October 2006.
33 Case  T-291/06,  Operator ARP v. Commission, application filed on 18 October 2006; Case 
T-297/06, Majatek Hutniczy v. Commission, application filed on 17 October 2006.
34  Order of 11 December 2006 in Case T-288/06R Huta Częstochowa v. Commission.
35 Case C 44/2005 (ex NN 79/2005, ex N 439/2004) – Restructuring aid in favour of Huta 
Stalowa Wola S.A.
36  OJ [2006] C 34/5.YEARBOOK of ANTITRUST and REGULATORY STUDIES
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public liabilities, amounting to EUR 17.3 million, which was granted without 
the Commission’s approval after Poland’s accession to the EU37. Following 
the formal investigation, on 20 December 2006, the Commission found that 
the measures complied with the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines in that: 
(i) the restructuring plan restored the long-term viability of HSW, (ii) the aid 
was limited to the minimum necessary through a substantial private financing 
contribution (in excess of 50%), and (iii) HSW offered compensatory measures 
(divestiture of a number of profitable subsidiaries), which limited the scope 
and scale of its activities38. 
Before the Commission’s decision was taken, HSW modified, however, its 
restructuring plan following changes in market conditions39. On 10 October 
2007, the Commission opened an in-depth investigation40 to establish whether 
the modified restructuring plan would enable the company to become profitable 
long-term41. Under Article 9 of the Procedural Regulation, this is a necessary 
step to revoke the original decision and for a new decision to be taken42.
 The Commission’s new investigation has focused on the capital injection 
granted to HSW by the Polish Industrial Development Agency in 2003 
and 2004. This loan took the form of a conversion into equity of two loans 
(already found to constitute State aid) intended to improve its liquidity 
and raise additional funds. The Commission is concerned that the capital 
injection would bring an additional advantage to HSW. During the pending 
investigation, the Commission will assess whether: (i) the aid is limited to the 
necessary minimum, (ii) there is no increase in the amount of aid, and (iii) 
37  The Commission had no competence to assess the compatibility of measures (amounting 
to EUR 41.2 million) granted before accession. These measures were, nevertheless, taken into 
account in the general assessment of post-accession aid. 
38  OJ [2007] L 112/67.
39  The Commission took a final positive decision on 20 December 2006 on the basis of the 
restructuring plan dated February 2006 and submitted by Poland on 9 March 2006. The Polish 
authorities notified an updated version of the plan dated November 2006 on 2 February 2007, 
i.e. after the original decision was already adopted (Case C 43/07 (ex N 64/07)).
40  OJ [2007] C 298/10.
41 The main modification is a change to the form of the aid: instead of HSW reimbursing 
two loans and interest on these loans, the Polish Industrial Development Agency would swap the 
nominal value of the debt into equity and thus become a shareholder of HSW. Other changes 
would include: postponements of organisational restructuring and a decision to undergo a less 
ambitious employment restructuring.
42 Article 9 of the Procedural Regulation stipulates that “the Commission may revoke 
a decision […] after having given the Member State concerned the opportunity to submit its 
comments, where the decision was based on incorrect information provided during the procedure 
which was a determining factor for the decision. Before revoking a decision and taking a new decision, 
the Commission shall open the formal investigation procedure pursuant to Article 4(4). […]”.Vol. 2008, 1(1)
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the original compensatory measures are proportional to the negative effects 
of the aid.
Technologie Buczek S.A. 
In March 2002, a steel producer, Huta Buczek (renamed Technologie Buczek 
S.A. (TB) from 7 May 2003) submitted a restructuring plan to the Polish 
authorities. The plan earmarked for TB State aid amounting to approximately 
PLN 16.2 million. It became part of the NRP, which was submitted to the 
European institutions and was assessed by the Commission on 25 March 
2003. The aid to TB was subsequently incorporated into Protocol No. 8. 
Poland’s compliance with Protocol No. 8 was monitored on a bi-annual basis. 
Following its independent evaluation in 2005 and a series of letters exchanged 
with the Polish authorities, on 7 June 2006, the Commission opened a formal 
investigation into the aid granted to the Technologie Buczek Group43, which, 
having failed to properly implement its restructuring plan had no option but 
to file for bankruptcy in 200644.
The Commission considered that the Technologie Buczek Group (viewed as 
one recipient45) misused the restructuring aid, which it had received in 2003. 
In particular, the Commission had serious doubts as to the proper use of State 
aid provided to this Group, which had not fully implemented its restructuring 
plan (as explicitly stipulated in point 9 of Protocol No. 8), which was directly 
proven by the fact that it did not achieve viability by 2006 and supported by 
the findings of the independent consultant. The potential misuse concerned 
the aid granted in 2002 and 2003 (approximately PLN 2.2 million) as well 
as the aid granted between 1997 and 2001 (PLN 4.4 million). Moreover, the 
Commission considered that additional aid might have been granted after 
2003 (through the budgetary grant for employment restructuring and non-
enforcement of the outstanding public debt). 
On 23 October 2007, the Commission adopted a negative decision against 
the Technologie Buczek Group46 finding that the non-enforcement after 2003 
43 Technologie Buczek Group included Technologie Buczek S.A. and its four subsidiaries 
with significant business activities: Buczek Automotive Sp. z o.o. (ex P.U.R.M. REMEBUD 
Sp. z o.o.), Huta Buczek Sp. z o.o., Buczek – HB – Z.P.R. Sp. z o.o. and P.U.T SAMKOL 
Sp. z o.o.
44 Case C-23/2006 (ex NN 35/2006) – Aid to steel producer Technologie Buczek Group, 
OJ [2006] C 196/23.
45 In particular, Huta Buczek Sp. z o.o. and Buczek Automotive Sp. z o.o. were viewed 
as parts of the economic entity of Technologie Buczek Group as they were: (i) 100% owned 
by Technologie Buczek, (ii) received their assets without adequate consideration, and (iii) 
benefited from the restructuring aid.
46  OJ [2008] L 116/26. YEARBOOK of ANTITRUST and REGULATORY STUDIES
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of public debts of approximately PLN 20.8 million (approximately EUR 5.3 
million) amounted to State aid incompatible with the EC State aid rules, and 
that certain amounts designated as restructuring aid, training aid, environmental 
aid and employment aid, totalling PLN 1.4 million, had been misused. The 
Commission ordered the recovery of the aid resulting from public debt non-
enforcement from Huta Buczek Sp. z o.o. and Buczek Automotive Sp. z o.o. 
in proportion, to the benefit actually obtained by them (approximately PLN 
13.6 million and PLN 7.2 million, respectively), and recovery of the misused 
aid from TB. 
The decision was appealed by Huta Buczek47, TB48 and Buczek Automotive49 
on a number of (mostly procedural) grounds. The appeal is pending before 
the CFI. 
Arcelor Huta Warszawa
Arcelor Huta Warszawa (AHW) is one of the largest steel producers in 
Poland, with an annual capacity of almost one million tons. In 2005, Arcelor 
took over the company, known at that time as Huta Lucchini Warszawa 
(HLW), from Lucchini. 
The NRP allocated PLN 322 million (approximately EUR 73 million) of 
restructuring aid to HLW. The restructuring, which mainly consisted of hot 
rolling mill investments and repayment of short-term liabilities, was to be 
financed primarily by a State-guaranteed bridging loan of about PLN 300 
million (approximately EUR 68 million). 
HLW obtained approximately 50% of the amount approved in the NRP and 
used most of it to repay a long-term loan, instead of carrying out the investments 
and restoring the company’s viability. When Arcelor took the company over, it 
decided to opt for a more ambitious investment strategy50 and amended HLW’s 
individual business plan (which required the Commission’s approval). 
On 6 December 2006, the Commission launched a formal investigation51. It 
considered that the use of the loan to pay off old debts was neither indicated in 
the restructuring plan nor necessary for the restructuring, and endangered the 
company’s ability to achieve economic viability. Therefore, the restructuring 
47 Case  T-440/07,  Huta Buczek v. Commission, application filed on 5 December 2007.
48 Case T-465/07, Salej and Technologie Buczek v. Commission, application filed on 20 
December 2007.
49 Case  T-1/08,  Buczek Automotive v. Commission, application filed on 8 January 2008.
50 Specifically, Arcelor wanted to replace its existing hot rolling mill by a new hot rolling 
mill (which required additional investments).
51 Case C-51/2006 (ex N 748/2006) – Misuse of aid to Arcelor Huta Warszawa, OJ [2007] 
C 35/41.Vol. 2008, 1(1)
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aid given to HLW and approved by the Commission under Protocol No. 8 
could be potentially incompatible with the Common Market and subject to 
recovery. 
On 12 December 2007, the Commission decided that, prior to becoming 
part of the Arcelor group, AHW had misused the restructuring aid it had 
received in 2003 under Protocol No. 8. While it remained undisputed that after 
Arcelor took the company over in 2005 it became viable and repaid the State-
guaranteed loan, the Commission considered that the advantage stemming 
from the aforementioned guarantee during a one year period amounted to 
unlawful State aid.
As the investments approved in the original restructuring plan were 
never implemented and the aid was not used for the indicated purposes, the 
Commission required the recovery of the aid (and AHW agreed to voluntarily 
repay the EUR 2 million of unlawful aid). The finding of the misuse of the aid 
received could not have been influenced by subsequent commitment to carry 
out the original investments because it could not “heal” the earlier misuse 
(see Lienemeyer and Mazurkiewicz-Gorgol 2008). 
The Commission ordered, however, only the recovery of the aid actually 
misused (an interest subsidy for the loan amounting to approximately EUR 2 
million) and not of the entire restructuring aid granted. This type of solution 
differs from the finding in the Technologie Buczek decision, where the 
Commission objected to the compatibility of the aid because the restructuring 
plan was not implemented in full and the company went into liquidation. AHW 
restored viability and thus paid only an amount equal to an interest subsidy, 
whereas Technologie Buczek never restored viability and therefore had to 
repay the entire amount of the restructuring aid which it had received. 
Other restructuring cases
Techmatrans S.A.
On 21 August 2006, Poland notified the Commission of the planned aid 
for Techmatrans52, a Polish State-owned company specialising in technological 
transportation devices and industrial plant systems for the automotive, 
metallurgical and construction sectors. Although the company met the SME 
thresholds, its State ownership placed it in the large enterprise category for 
the purposes of State aid assessment. On 21 February 2007, the Commission 
opened a formal investigation into the proposed capital injection of EUR 
0.8 million for Techmatrans53. The Commissions had doubts: (i) whether the 
52  Case C-6/07 (ex N 558/06) – Restructuring aid to Techmatrans S.A.
53  OJ [2007] C 77/43.YEARBOOK of ANTITRUST and REGULATORY STUDIES
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intended restructuring would be sufficient to restore long-term viability of 
the company (due to the low projected profit margin); (ii) regarding the low 
level of the proposed “own” contribution (3% by 2010); and (iii) regarding the 
economic rationality of the proposed compensatory measures. 
During the formal investigation, the Polish authorities provided detailed 
data on the proposed investment programme that allayed the doubts regarding 
the restoration of economic viability. In particular, they provided examples 
of private companies active in the same sector that generated similarly low 
profit margins (2-4%). The Commission also took into account the proposed 
privatization of Techmatrans scheduled to take place in 2009/2010. The 
Polish authorities also showed that “own” contribution was indeed in excess 
of 50% (over PLN 3 million out of a total of under PLN 6 million). Finally, 
the company’s intended withdrawal from one of its activities (the design and 
sale of technological transport steering systems) was deemed rational. The 
Commission, therefore, authorised the implementation of the State aid under 
Techmatrans’ restructuring plan54.
Bison-Bial S.A.
On 4 May 2006, the Polish authorities notified the Commission of a planned 
restructuring aid for Bison-Bial S.A., a Polish machine tools manufacturer, 
in the form of a public debt write-off and a loan (granted on preferential 
conditions) totalling EUR 7.6 million (intended to repay past public debt)55. 
Following a preliminary assessment, the Commission expressed doubts whether 
the restructuring plan would be sufficient to restore the company’s long-term 
viability and would avoid difficulties similar to those faced by the company in 2001 
(which led to a decrease in the workforce from 1,680 to 950 employees)56. 
After a formal investigation, the Commission decided that the aid would be 
compatible with EC State aid rules provided that several conditions were met. 
First, the restructuring plan had to be implemented in full by the end of the 
prolonged restructuring period (i.e. 2010). Second, Bison-Bial’s existing site 
had to be sold and a significant additional investment (including a change to 
the manufacturing plant’s location) had to be made by the end of 2010. Finally, 
Bison-Bial had to sell, by the end of 2009, one of its profitable production 
divisions, therefore decreasing its product range by 46% and the number of 
machine tools by 12%, as well as reducing turnover by 13%57. These provisions, 
54  OJ [2008] L 86/28.
55  Case C-54/2006 (ex N 276/2006) – Restructuring aid to Bison-Bial S.A.
56  OJ [2007] C 23/20.
57 The Commission rejected two other alternative proposals, namely the reduction of the 
number of goods produced by 5% or the sale of 5% of the company’s machines.Vol. 2008, 1(1)
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together with the significant “own” contribution (in excess of 50%) as well as 
the fact that the State aid had been granted in the form of a reimbursable loan, 
allowed the Commission to approve the notified State aid to Bison-Bial58. 
Fabryka Samochodów Osobowych S.A.
The restructuring aid for Fabryka Samochodów Osobowych S.A. (FSO) was 
the first case where the Commission opened a formal investigation procedure 
on pending State aid measures notified by a new Member State. 
On 30 April 2004, the Polish authorities notified the Commission, in light 
of the interim procedure set out in the Accession Treaty, its decision to grant 
restructuring aid to FSO (previously Daewoo-FSO Motor S.A.), one of the 
largest Polish producers of passenger cars located in Warsaw59. FSO faced 
a difficult economic situation in 2000, mainly due to the bankruptcy of its 
largest shareholder Daewoo Motor Corporation Ltd. Following these events, 
FSO became State-controlled and adopted, or planned to adopt, various 
restructuring measures amounting to approximately EUR 172 million (planned 
for the period of time between the end of 2003 and the end of 2006).
On 19 January 2005, the Commission launched a formal investigation into 
these measures60. In the opening decision, the Commission considered that 
certain aid, amounting to approximately EUR 35 million, was considered 
to have been granted before, but “not applicable after accession” and was, 
as a consequence, outside the Commission’s jurisdiction. As a result, the 
investigation focused on other measures that, according to the Commission, 
had not yet been granted. On 20 December 2006, the Commission adopted a 
decision, in which it confirmed that the majority of the restructuring measures 
(totalling approximately EUR 75 million61) fell under its jurisdiction and 
conditionally approved them, subject to production and sales caps applicable 
until February 201162. The Commission explained that the reason for the 
imposition of these conditions was to avoid shifting the difficulties in the car 
manufacturing sector to other firms. 
58 See: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/state_aid/register/ii/doc/C-54-2006-WLWL-
en-12.09.2007.pdf.
59 Case C-3/2005 (ex N 592/2004) – Restructuring aid to Fabryka Samochodów Osobo-
wych S.A.
60  OJ [2005] C 100/2.
61 The decision of 19 January 2005 launching a formal investigation (based on the initial 
Polish notification submitted on 30 April 2004) considered approximately EUR 138 million 
to be potential new aid (largely due to the significantly larger amount of the notified State 
guarantee for a future investment loan).
62  OJ [2007] L 187/30.YEARBOOK of ANTITRUST and REGULATORY STUDIES
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On 22 March 2007, FSO lodged an appeal63 against the decision alleging 
breaches of the principle of proportionality, the principle of free exercise of 
economic activity, a manifest error of appraisal of the facts of the case, as well 
as a breach of Article 253 EC. The appeal is pending before the CFI. 
B. Other State aid cases
Poczta Polska
On 30 April 2004, as part of the “interim mechanism”64, Poland notified the 
Commission of two aid schemes granted to Poczta Polska, the Polish public 
postal operator entrusted with the universal postal service obligation within 
Poland. The first case (registered as PL 45/04) concerned compensation to 
Poczta Polska for carrying out universal postal services. The second case 
(registered as PL 49/04) concerned aid to Poczta Polska for investments related 
to the provision of universal postal services. On 29 June 2005, the Commission 
decided to initiate a formal investigation into the two aid schemes65. On 27 
April 2006, the Commission terminated its investigation into the investment 
aid because the Polish authorities withdrew their notification and the aid was 
never implemented66. On 9 January 2007, the Commission partially terminated 
the investigation into the compensation scheme for universal services for the 
period 2004-2005 seeing as the aid was never implemented67. It is continuing 
the procedure for the period from 1 January 2006 onwards. 
During its investigations of the two aforementioned schemes, it became 
apparent to the Commission that Poczta Polska benefited from a pre-existing 
legal status, which prevented it from going bankrupt68. By way of an Article 
17 letter69, sent on 10 May 2005, the Commission informed Poland about its 
preliminary conclusion that the legal status of Poczta Polska under the applicable 
Polish legislation amounted to an existing aid in the form of an unlimited State 
guarantee70. A State guarantee of unlimited duration and amount covering 
63 Case T-88/07, Fabryka Samochodów Osobowych v. Commission, application filed on 
22 March 2007.
64  Kuik K., “State Aid ...”, op. cit. 
65  OJ [2005] C 274/14
66  OJ [2006] C 223/11. 
67  OJ [2007] C 33/9.
68  Case C-12/2005 – Unlimited State guarantee in favour of Poczta Polska.
69  Article 17 of the Council Regulation (EC) 659/1999.
70 The Commission referred to point 2.1.3 of the Commission’s Guarantee Notice, which 
states that ‘the Commission also regards as aid in the form of a guarantee, the more favourable 
funding terms obtained by enterprises whose legal form rules out bankruptcy or other insolvency 
procedures or provides an explicit State guarantee or coverage of losses by the State’; see Commission Vol. 2008, 1(1)
2007 EC COMPETITION LAW AND SECTOR-SPECIFIC REGULATORY CASE…  183
all liabilities of Poczta Polska provided it with an economic advantage, and 
thus amounted to incompatible State aid. The Polish authorities subsequently 
committed themselves to abolishing the unlimited State guarantee at the latest 
by 30 June 2008 and thus, the Commission closed the existing aid proceedings 
by adopting a decision proposing “appropriate measures” pursuant to Article 
88(1) EC (accepted by the Member State concerned)71. 
The Poczta Polska cases should be viewed in the context of the Commission’s 
overall aim, which is to ensure that postal operators and their subsidiaries 
do not enjoy undue advantages, which could negate the effects of the on-
going liberalisation process of the postal sector. This involved assessing the 
compatibility of compensations granted to postal operators for providing 
services of general economic interest, as well as examining, whether postal 
operators were enjoying other advantages (such as unlimited State guarantees 
which result in lower financing costs). Thus, in addition to the Poczta Polska 
cases, on 29 November 2007, the Commission targeted France’s La Poste72 
and, on 21 February 2007, a series of funding measures taken by the United 
Kingdom in favour of Royal Mail73. 
Power Purchase Agreements (stranded costs)
Poland’s main energy sector aim in the mid-1990s was to modernise its 
power generation infrastructure and to ensure security of supply. To facilitate 
the achievement of these objectives, Poland introduced a system of long-term 
Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) to incentivise power generators to invest 
in Poland. Under these agreements, signed between 1994 and 1998, and which 
would have expired between 2005 and 2027, the State-owned network operator 
PSE had an obligation to purchase a fixed amount of electricity at a fixed price. 
Their price formulae guaranteed the viability of the generators concerned for 
the entire duration of the agreements. The Commission considered that such 
conditions created a barrier to a proper liberalisation of the power generation 
sector in Poland (the PPAs related to approximately 50% of the electricity 
generated and sold in Poland). 
Notice on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to State aid in the form of 
guarantees, OJ [2000] C 71/14.
71  OJ [2007] C 284/2007.
72  Case C-56/2007 (ex E 15/2005) – Garantie illimitée de l’Etat en faveur de La Poste. The 
Commission also examined public aid to finance La Poste’s pension scheme and, on 10 October 
2007, gave a conditional authorisation for public aid to finance La Poste’s pensions for civil 
servants (see case C 43/2006 – Projet de réforme du financement des retraites des fonctionnaires 
de La Poste française).
73  Case C-7/2007 (ex NN 82/2006 and NN 83/2006) – Alleged aid in favour of Royal 
Mail, OJ [2007] C 91/34.YEARBOOK of ANTITRUST and REGULATORY STUDIES
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On 1 March 2005, Poland notified to the Commission a Draft Law74 
that would allow generators to cancel their PPAs voluntarily and obtain in 
return a compensation covering stranded costs (i.e. costs which arise from 
the cancellation of long-term agreements that cannot be recouped by the 
generator). On 23 November 2005, the Commission launched a formal 
investigation into the Polish PPAs and the Draft Law. It considered that the 
PPAs constituted incompatible State aid as they foreclosed a significant part 
of the market and provided certain generators with a selective advantage 
over other power generators or other comparable sectors where no such 
long-term agreements were even proposed. Moreover, the Commission also 
initially considered that the compensation for the cancellation of PPAs under 
the Draft Law would not fulfil the conditions set out in the Commission’s 
methodology for analysing State aid linked to stranded costs75 and would, 
therefore, constitute incompatible State aid. 
On 25 September 2007, the Commission decided to order the termination 
of the PPAs. Pursuant to this decision, the agreements on the annulment of the 
PPAs should have been concluded by 1 January 2008 and become effective on 
1 April 2008 at the latest, in line with the Draft Law. In the same decision the 
Commission approved however the compensation included in the Draft Law 
for stranded costs, for those generators, which benefited from the PPAs, on 
the basis of the Commission’s stranded costs methodology. The compensation 
system was deemed compatible with EC State aid rules as the compensation 
would not exceed what was necessary to recoup the shortfall in investment costs 
repayment over the assets’ lifetime including, where necessary, a reasonable 
profit margin. A similar State aid procedure into PPAs covering around 80% 
of the power generation market in Hungary ended on 4 June 2008 with a 
negative decision and recovery76.
The Commission decision launching a formal investigation into the Polish 
PPAs was appealed and brought before the CFI by Elektrociepłownia “Zielona 
Góra” (part of the Electricite de France Group) on 12 May 200677. Following 
the adoption of the Commission’s final decision on 25 September 2007, the 
74  Poland also notified an earlier version of the draft law as part of the ‘interim mechanism’ 
(PL 1/2003 – Polish stranded costs). The Commission objected and the law has never been 
adopted.
75 The methodology implemented by the Commission to assess the stranded costs 
compensation scheme uses criteria, which ensure that the aid compensates costs genuinely 
incurred by the recipient companies and directly linked to the liberalisation of the sector; 
see Commission Communication relating to the methodology for analysing State aid linked 
to stranded costs adopted on 26 July 2006 (the ‘Stranded Cost Methodology’), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/state_aid/legislation/stranded_costs_en.pdf. 
76  Case C-41/2005 (ex NN 49/2005) – Hungarian stranded costs. 
77  Case T-142/06, Elektrocieplownia “Zielona Gora” v. Commission.Vol. 2008, 1(1)
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application was eventually withdrawn and removed from the court register 
on 14 April 2008.
IV. Regulatory
A. Article 7 veto decisions
Article 7 of the Electronic Communications Framework Directive 2002/21/
EC (the Framework Directive) requires national regulatory authorities 
(NRAs), in consultation with the industry, to analyse their national markets for 
electronic communications and propose suitable measures to deal with market 
failures. NRAs should notify their findings and their proposed measures to the 
Commission and other NRAs. The aim of the procedure is to enable NRAs to 
assess whether any companies in the electronic communications market have 
significant market power (SMP) and, where companies are found to have SMP, 
to propose appropriate remedies to prevent such companies from impeding 
effective competition. 
The Commission normally approves or comments on measures within a 
one-month Phase I procedure. If it concludes that the proposed measure is 
likely to create a barrier to the Single Market or has serious doubts about its 
compatibility with EU law, it will open a Phase II investigation and can then 
require a NRA to withdraw a proposed measure by imposing a veto. In relation 
to Poland, the Commission has used this veto power in a case concerning the 
Polish NRA’s analysis of the retail markets for access to the public telephone 
network at a fixed location in Poland78. On 10 January 2007, the Commission 
adopted its fifth veto decision79 under Article 7(4) of the Framework Directive. 
The Commission had serious doubts about the market definition proposed by 
the Polish regulator, which included broadband connections (such as DSL 
connections) in the same product market as narrowband connections. Under 
the proposed measures, broadband connections would be made subject to 
the same retail regulation as other (PSTN and ISDN) connections. In its 
revised analysis following the Commission’s veto, the Polish NRA still partially 
included retail broadband access in the relevant market, which resulted in a 
further letter from the Commission expressing serious doubts. In April 2007, 
the Polish NRA decided to change its market definition by removing all retail 
broadband services from the scope of the product market definition, and the 
measures could finally be adopted. 
78  Cases PL/2006/0518 and PL/2006/0524.
79  In seven cases, moreover, there were numerous cases where NRAs have withdrawn their 
own measures to avoid a veto decision. YEARBOOK of ANTITRUST and REGULATORY STUDIES
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B. Other procedures
The Commission opened ten separate infringement proceedings against 
Poland concerning the telecoms sector; these cases are listed in Table C below. 
By the end of 2007, five cases have been closed as Poland adopted required 
measures (in two of these cases, the Commission had to launch court actions 
before the European Court of Justice)80. In 2007, two court proceedings 
were pending against Poland (listed in Table A below)81. In two cases, the 
Commission’s administrative procedure is currently ongoing82.
Literature
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Kuik K., “State Aid and the 2004 Accession – Overview of Recent Developments” (2004) 
3(3) European State Aid Law Quarterly.
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80 Cases 2005/2207, 2005/2063, 2005/2062 and 2004/1244, 2004/1251, 2004/1256. The 
Commission has referred case 2005/2207 to the ECJ before Poland complied with EC law.
81  Cases C-492/07 (following the infringement procedure 2005/2060) and C-227/07 (following 
the infringement procedure 2005/2061). 
82 As of 20 October 2008; cases 2005/2291 (reasoned opinion) and 2007/2430 (letter of 
formal notice).Vol. 2008, 1(1)
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